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Following the European Parliament’s approval of the 26 candidates proposed by Member States to form the new European Commission (2024-2029), the new European super-ministers will take office on 1 December. Notably, for the first time, the core of “Europe’s government” includes two representatives from the far-right: Italian Raffaele Fitto, nominated by the Meloni Government as Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms, overseeing structural funds, and Hungarian Olivér Várhelyi, appointed by Viktor Orbán’s government as Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare.
In addition to the intense institutional focus on strengthening European industrial policy—reflected in several portfolios and two Vice-Presidents with responsibilities in the area—another major development is the appointment of a European Commissioner and the establishment of a new Directorate General dedicated to the Mediterranean. Previously, cooperation with Mediterranean countries was managed by the Commissioner for Neighbourhood (and its Directorate General, DG NEAR) alongside relations with Eastern European and South Caucasus non-candidate countries. The designated Commissioner for this new role is Croatian Dubravka Šuica, who previously served as Vice-President for Democracy and Demography in the 2019-2024 European Commission.
The Union for the Mediterranean Out of the Picture: Introducing the new Pact for the Mediterranean
After two decades of declining European Union interest in its Southern Neighbourhood, the creation of a dedicated Mediterranean portfolio might suggest a renewed geostrategic focus on the region. However, a closer examination of the appointment—and the mission letter sent by European Commissioner President Ursula Von der Leyen to the new Commissioner setting out her mandate—raises significant questions about the European Union’s actual intentions for and understanding of the Mediterranean.
While the mission letter acknowledges that “a strengthened Mediterranean partnership remains a strategic imperative for Europe, and our common sustainable prosperity, security and resilience can only be built in partnership,” it conspicuously omits any mention of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). This omission is striking given that the UfM, the successor to the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, has been the primary albeit lackluster framework for Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation since 2008.
In her written responses to the European Parliament (spanning 12 pages) for her confirmation as Commissioner, Ms. Šuica referred to the UfM only once, in connection with her future relation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM. During her three-hour confirmation hearing, the new Commissioner did not mention the UfM at all. When directly questioned about it, she instead outlined “a new Pact for Mediterranean,” explaining: “The first initiative will be a new Pact for Mediterranean. This will be a new document and a basis for our future work. What does it mean? The New Pact for Mediterranean will comprise two pillars. One pillar will be building strategic partnership agreements with countries in North Africa, but also in countries all over the Mediterranean. The second pillar will be regional cooperation, which understands bringing European companies to the region (sic).”
Since its establishment in 2010, the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona has “labeled” over 60 projects of Euro-Mediterranean interest and facilitates regional meetings and policy dialogue across six key areas: Economic Development and Employment, Higher Education and Research, Social and Civil Affairs, Water, Environment and Blue Economy, Transport and Urban Development, Energy and Climate Action. While it is primarily funded by the European Commission as a regional initiative subject to the EU’s financial and administrative procedures, the UfM does not appear to be a priority for the European Commission’s Mediterranean strategy in the coming period. This suggests a further shift toward prioritizing bilateral cooperation over regional frameworks.
In contrast, in the letter of mission sent by the President of the European Commission this “new Pact for the Mediterranean,” and the main priorities of the European Union and the new portfolio in the Mediterranean are clearly outlined. The focus will be on “comprehensive partnerships,” which are assumed to follow a bilateral, country-by-country approach, emphasizing “investment, economic stability, jobs, energy, transport, security, migration and other areas of mutual interest.” In EU jargon, “comprehensive partnerships” often signal migration control conditionality, as clarified a few lines further in the letter: “You will ensure these comprehensive partnerships operationalise the external aspects of our migration policy, notably covering border controls and the fight against smugglers, in respect of human rights.” Notably, this is the sole reference to human rights or democracy in the entire letter concerning the Mediterranean. By contrast, the Commissioner for Enlargement is tasked with prioritizing “the rule of law and fundamental values, which will always remain the cornerstone of the EU’s enlargement policy.”
The framework is clear, even if the letter pays lip service to shared European values—an approach largely undermined by the failed track record of the European Neighbourhood Policy since 2003 in this area: “You will ensure that our values and principles are at the heart of the Pact and our engagement with the region.” Other priority areas outlined include “scaling up and deepening trade and investment” and the “Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean Tech Cooperation Initiative.” Additionally, the new commissioner will, in coordination with the High Representative for Foreign Policy, oversee the EU Middle East Strategy, which includes a “multi-year Support Programme for the Palestinian Authority” and “a dedicated reconstruction plan for Gaza.”
After the ill-fated implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-2008), the European Neighbourhood Policy (2003-2027), the Union for the Mediterranean (2008-), the new Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021-2027), and various other bilateral initiatives such as the Advanced Status with Morocco (2008), the Privileged Partnership with Tunisia (2012), the Mobility Partnerships (Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, 2014), the EU-Turkey Deal (2016), the Partnership for Shared Prosperity with Morocco (2019), the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt (2024), and the EU-Lebanon Compact (2024), the credibility of this new Pact for the Mediterranean remains limited.
However, perhaps the most telling clue lies in the last paragraph of the mission letter concerning the Mediterranean: “I would like you to work with the High Representative/Vice-President on a strategic communication plan to promote the EU’s role in the Southern Neighbourhood, highlighting its contributions and countering anti-EU narratives. I want you to engage directly with local communities in this work.” It seems that the battle for narratives, rather than for joint development prospects, has taken precedence.
The End of the European Neighbourhood Policy
So, the European Union’s interests in the region have shifted from a focus on joint development, shared prosperity, and security, as it was the case in 1995, to prioritizing migration control, security, conflict damage control, energy, and trade. The new Commissioner will be supported by a new Directorate-General for the Mediterranean, a spin-off of the current DG NEAR. This marks the institutionalization of the decoupling of the Mediterranean (Southern Neighbourhood) from the Western Balkans, Eastern European and Southern Caucasus countries (Eastern Partnership and accession candidate countries), which will now be handled by the Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood.
As a result, the fundamental agreements made in 1994 to balance financial and institutional assistance to the South and the East of the European Union—aimed at facilitating the first Eastern European enlargement—along with the strategic vision of offering neighbouring countries, also in the Mediterranean, the prospect of integrating into the European Union’s single market and sectoral programs (“all but the institutions”), are now largely relegated to the annals of political history.
The profiles and mission letters of the new European Commissioners can be found here: https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/towards-new-commission-2024-2029/commissioners-designate-2024-2029_en
