Publications /
Policy Paper

Back
“Delenda est Cotonou ?” The European Union and the ACP States: A Partnership without Partners
Authors
Dominique Lecompte
Thierry Vircoulon
March 14, 2022

Although it has largely gone unnoticed in France, the agreement signed on December 3, 2020 between the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) is a major shift in the long-standing relations between the EU and countries in the Global South. The EU established a development assistance policy as early as the Treaty of Rome in 1957, signed the first cooperation agreement in 1963, and nowadays is often the largest donor to these countries, particularly in Africa. The EU plans to allocate approximately €80 billion to its Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument from 2021 to 2027.

But the EU's development assistance policy has evolved significantly from the Yaoundé Convention in 1963 to the December3, 2020 agreement. When this policy was based on economic developmentalism, it advocated comanagement of development assistance and prioritized infrastructure and integration into international trade, but it has gradually changed paradigm and assumed new approaches. The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, symbolized this change: democratic governance became the new benchmark, and development assistance was coupled with political priorities, major infrastructure projects were replaced by budget support and engineers were replaced by managers. This change has had harmful consequences. On the one hand, the expansion of political objectives coupled to development assistance, the subordination of assistance to European diplomacy, the proliferation of strategic documents and the increase in financial instruments have made the European development assistance policy unclear and incomprehensible. On the other hand, the politicization and bureaucratization of development assistance policy has undermined the principle of comanagement that characterized the European Development Fund.

The management of European aid is becoming less and less partnership-based and increasingly complex, with many governments in the Global South turning away from it and relying on alternative donors. While the prioritization of security and migration policy in European development assistance annoys some partners in the Global South, in Brussels they are criticized for the lack of results from the billions of dollars in assistance provided to them.

As a result, signs of disinterest, or even disagreement, are increasing, sometimes resulting in diplomatic tensions between the EU and the ACP countries.

The agreement of December 3, 2020, which formally ends comanagement of development assistance and no longer makes development the top priority, illustrates this gradual disenchantment between the European donor and the beneficiary countries, and in the coming years it can lead to a partnership without partners.

RELATED CONTENT

  • Authors
    July 15, 2026
    We Are Watching You In April 2026, the UK Ministry of Defence revealed that it had tracked a covert Russian submarine operation apparently intended to map critical undersea cables and pipelines in the North Atlantic and the North Sea. A Russian attack submarine and two specialised intelligence vessels operated by the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, commonly known as GUGI, were reportedly monitored for four weeks by the Royal Navy, including HMS St Albans and P-8 Poseidon ...
  • Authors
    April 10, 2026
    On February 10, 2026, the European Parliament endorsed an asylum reform that expands the use of the ‘safe third country’ concept and introduces a common European Union list of ‘safe countries of origin’. This reform represents more than a technical adjustment of asylum procedures, as it signals a structural reorientation of EU asylum governance toward faster filtering of claims and greater reliance on external actors.The concept of a safe third country already exists in European asy ...
  • Authors
    December 18, 2025
    The return of President Donald Trump to the White House at the start of 2025 was expected to signal an American retreat from international engagement, especially in regions of traditional security interest, such as southern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. To the surprise of many observers around the Mediterranean, and perhaps to the dismay of some in the Trump administration’s ideological orbit, this has not happened. If anything, the second half of 2025 has seen a high d ...
  • November 4, 2025
    Cette tribune a été initialement publiée sur telos-eu.comSi un domaine est supposé devoir échapper à la « démocratie d’opinion », c’est bien la politique étrangère, surtout dans la France de la Ve République. Elle se doit d’être articulée autour d’intérêts à long terme et de calculs savants, sans reculer devant la raison d’Etat. L’opinion des Français à son propos est rarement scrutée.Elle se révèle plus construite qu’on ne croit. Telle est la leçon du sondage Toluna-Louis ...
  • October 23, 2025
    Depuis plus de trente ans, les relations entre le Maroc et l’Union européenne (UE) se caractérisent par un équilibre entre pragmatisme politique, ouverture économique et convergence stratégique. Le processus de Barcelone de 1995 a marqué le début d’une coopération euro-méditerranéenne renforcée, consolidée par l’Accord du Statut avancé en 2008 et le Partenariat euro-marocain de prospérité partagée, faisant de l’UE le principal partenaire économique du Royaume. Dans un contexte régio ...
  • Authors
    September 4, 2025
    This policy brief analyzes the first 100 days in office of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, which have been marked by an assertive foreign policy, ambitious security reforms, and a shift toward economic pragmatism. Merz has sought to reestablish Germany as a ‘leading middle power’, emphasizing closer European coordination, renewed transatlantic engagement, and unwavering support for Ukraine. However, his approach to the Gaza conflict, characterized by alignment with U.S. positions and rel ...
  • Authors
    Fadoua Ammari
    June 13, 2025
    Dans un contexte international en recomposition, et à l’instar des autres membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (États-Unis, France, Royaume-Uni), la Chine et la Russie réévaluent leurs positionnements respectifs sur le dossier du Sahara marocain, longtemps relégué à la périphérie de leurs priorités. À travers une lecture croisée des dynamiques historiques, des échanges bilatéraux avec le Maroc et des interactions dans les enceintes multilatérales, notamment à ...