Publications /
Opinion

Back
Crisis in Sudan: A Complex Power Play With Regional Implications and Global Stakes
Authors
Imane Lahrich
November 19, 2024

Sudan, a nation long defined by civil strife, military coups, and an uneven trajectory towards democratic norms, now faces a devastating internal war. The eruption of conflict on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has escalated into a multidimensional crisis. This conflict, fueled by longstanding political rivalries and resource-based tensions, poses grave risks to the stability of Sudan and the broader Horn of Africa. Beyond Sudan’s borders, the crisis has engaged regional and international actors, underlining Sudan’s role in a broader geopolitical contest. As underscored by Kidane Kiros's analysis, Sudan's crisis is not merely a localized issue but a symptom of structural and systemic failures with wide-reaching implications.

Backdrop to the Conflict

The roots of Sudan's turmoil can be traced back to its fraught political transition after the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019. Initially, the power-sharing agreement between military leaders and civilian factions provided a glimmer of hope for democratization. However, the October 2021 coup, orchestrated by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, derailed these efforts, intensifying divisions within the military and civilian spheres. Concurrently, the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), leveraged its economic dominance of gold mining, and its alliances with regional powers, to assert influence.

The rift between Burhan and Hemedti over integrating the RSF into the national army epitomizes Sudan’s fragmented political landscape. These tensions highlight the broader challenges of consolidating state authority in a country where competing factions vie for power and resources, often to the detriment of national unity.

Economic and Social Devastation

Sudan’s economy, already fragile before the conflict, has been decimated, with the war inflicting an estimated $15 billion in losses. Critical sectors such as agriculture and industry have been severely disrupted, causing immediate and long-term setbacks to economic activity. This figure reflects not only one-off destruction—such as the loss of infrastructure and productive assets—but also a deeper, more prolonged impact on GDP, which will likely take years to recover. Compounding this crisis is the ‘resource curse’ dynamic, where the exploitation of natural resources, particularly gold, has exacerbated conflict rather than driving sustainable economic development.

The social consequences are equally dire. Ethnic tensions, particularly in Darfur, have escalated, leading to allegations of war crimes and ethnic cleansing. More than 90% of Sudan’s 19 million school-aged children have no access to formal education, with most schools closed or struggling to reopen. This education loss jeopardizes the nation’s future and highlights the far-reaching impact of the crisis. The displacement flows have created a vulnerable underclass, exacerbating inequalities and fostering resentment. These dynamics threaten to perpetuate cycles of violence, further undermining prospects for national reconciliation.

Humanitarian Catastrophe

The war has plunged Sudan into an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. As of October, 2024, an estimated 11,018,231 Sudanese are classified as internally displaced persons (IDPs), including 8.27 million displaced since April 15, 2023. Khartoum, South Darfur, and North Darfur, are significant places of origin of IDPs, with 33%, 19%, and 15%, respectively, of all IDPs originating from these states, and 65.6% of the population living below the poverty line. Major cities have become battlegrounds, leaving essential infrastructure—hospitals, schools, and food supply chains—in ruins, reflecting how Sudan’s humanitarian emergency exemplifies the concept of ‘structural violence’, in which systemic inequalities and political instability exacerbate human suffering.

The acute shortages of food and healthcare have further deepened the crisis, placing 755,000 individuals at risk of famine in North Darfur's Zamzam camp and other regions. Over half the population of Sudan (25.6 million people) faced crisis or worse levels of food insecurity between June and September 2024. The displacement of millions into neighboring countries including Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt has overwhelmed regional capacities, creating a ripple effect of instability. Mixed cross-border movements since April 15, 2023, have reached 3,128,939 individuals, with Egypt hosting the largest share (39%), followed by Chad (28%), and South Sudan (27%).

This dire situation underscores the necessity for a global humanitarian response that prioritizes immediate relief, while addressing systemic drivers of conflict and displacement.

Risks of Regional Destabilization

The ongoing war in Sudan poses significant risks to regional stability, particularly in Chad’s eastern Wadai region, which is grappling with the arrival of a substantial refugee population from Darfur. A recent report by the International Crisis Group highlights these risks, noting the massive socioeconomic pressures Chad faces due to the refugee influx and the broader implications of Sudan’s conflict.

The situation escalated last week as Sudan accused Chad of aiding the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Chad, in turn, alleged that Sudan is arming groups believed to be targeting its territory. These mutual claims, coupled with the burden of hosting over 930,000 refugees, underscore Chad’s precarious position. The Wadai region, already strained by limited resources, faces further destabilization from the influx of refugees—90% of whom are women and children. These challenges are compounded by allegations of Chad’s involvement in arms transfers from the UAE to the RSF, adding another layer of complexity to an already volatile geopolitical dynamic. Without effective intervention, these pressures could cascade into broader instability across the Sahel.

Sudan’s conflict extends beyond its immediate neighbors, with broader implications for regional and international stability. Its strategic position at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East amplifies the stakes, while the Horn of Africa—a region already marked by fragility—faces heightened risks of destabilization. Internally, the conflict has displaced populations to 9,470 locations across Sudan’s 18 states, with South Darfur hosting the largest proportion at 17%. Externally, neighboring countries like Ethiopia, Chad, and Egypt are grappling with spillover effects such as arms trafficking and refugee flows, which undermine their security and economic stability.

Proxy Wars and Geopolitical Rivalry

Sudan has become a focal point for the competing interests of external powers, reflecting broader patterns of strategic rivalry in politically unstable and resource-rich regions. Conflicts in such contexts often attract foreign involvement, with actors leveraging local instability to secure economic, military, and geopolitical advantages. In Sudan, Russia’s alignment with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), facilitated through Wagner Group operations, exemplifies this dynamic. Wagner’s involvement in gold mining provides Russia with critical financial resources while circumventing Western sanctions, showcasing how resource access serves as a key instrument of influence in conflict zones.

Other powers, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, are also active in the region, navigating the complexities of Sudan’s geopolitical importance. This convergence of competing agendas further undermines Sudan’s sovereignty, as external actors prioritize strategic positioning over the country’s stability. Sudan’s location near the Red Sea, a vital maritime corridor, heightens its strategic significance, with discussions of potential Russian naval bases adding an additional layer of tension to an already volatile regional landscape.

The Sudanese conflict typifies a growing reliance on proxy wars, where external powers back local factions to advance their interests while avoiding direct confrontation. Partnerships between the RSF and actors such as Russia and the UAE highlight the transactional nature of these engagements, which perpetuate violence, complicate peace efforts, and entangle Sudan in a web of broader rivalries.

The Wagner Group’s involvement illustrates how external actors operationalize influence in fragile political environments. By providing military support to the RSF in exchange for access to gold reserves, Wagner enhances its strategic leverage while weakening Sudan’s governance. Such arrangements entrench Sudan’s role as a theater for great power competition, locking the region into cycles of dependency and instability.

These dynamics have far-reaching implications. Prolonged conflict, erosion of governance, and entrenched foreign influence have become defining features of politically unstable nations where resource wealth attracts external agendas. Sudan’s case underscores the dangers of these patterns, highlighting how vulnerable states remain exposed to the strategic ambitions of more powerful actors.

Failed Peace Initiatives

International efforts to mediate the Sudanese conflict have faced significant setbacks, reflecting the complexities of conflicts rooted in deeply entrenched inequalities and fragmented political landscapes. Initiatives such as the African Union’s roadmap and the Saudi-U.S.-led Jeddah process have been hindered by the disunity among Sudan’s political and military actors. Leaders like Burhan and Hemedti have capitalized on these divisions, manipulating negotiations while securing external support to sustain their military campaigns. These dynamics illustrate how fragmented environments undermine the prospects for durable peace agreements.

The failure of these initiatives stems in part from a narrow focus on elite-level mediation that neglects the structural conditions driving the conflict. Sudan’s longstanding issues of marginalization, resource inequities, and governance imbalances remain unaddressed, perpetuating cycles of violence. Peacebuilding approaches that concentrate on ceasefires and political settlements often fail to engage with these deeper grievances, leaving the root causes of instability intact.

The behavior of the warring factions reflects a strategic calculus shaped by their assessment of immediate gains and risks. For leaders entrenched in the conflict, maintaining territorial control, accessing resources, and leveraging external alliances provide tangible short-term benefits. These priorities outweigh the uncertain rewards of peace agreements, particularly in a context where power consolidation is viewed as critical for survival. This rational approach to conflict perpetuates a zero-sum dynamic, where compromise is seen as a threat rather than a path to resolution.

The Need for a Comprehensive Approach

Resolving Sudan’s crisis necessitates a multidimensional approach that transcends temporary ceasefires and short-term humanitarian interventions. The entrenched political, economic, and social drivers of conflict require systemic redress to lay the foundation for sustainable peace. Priority must be given to reforming the security sector, which continues to act as both a driver of instability and a tool for entrenched power structures. Ensuring accountability for atrocities is not only a moral imperative but also a critical step toward restoring trust in governance and the rule of law. Furthermore, inclusive dialogue that incorporates all stakeholders is essential to fostering legitimacy and addressing grievances at the heart of the conflict.

The African Union, guided by its principle of “African solutions to African problems,” is uniquely positioned to lead these efforts. Its regional legitimacy enables it to facilitate processes tailored to Sudan’s complex sociopolitical context. However, achieving meaningful progress will depend on substantial international support. Financial resources and logistical expertise from global partners are indispensable to bolster AU-led initiatives, ensuring they are adequately resourced and effectively implemented.

Equally critical is the need to balance respect for Sudan’s sovereignty with the imperative to mitigate the destabilizing effects of external interference. Uncoordinated foreign involvement risks exacerbating factional divisions, undermining efforts toward reconciliation and governance reform. A carefully calibrated approach that prioritizes Sudanese agency while integrating regional and international support offers the most viable path toward a resolution that is both inclusive and enduring.

Conclusion

As the country teeters on the brink of collapse, the international community faces a critical test. Will it prioritize a Sudanese-led resolution that addresses the root causes of conflict, or will it allow external interests to dictate the country's future? The stakes are high, not only for Sudan but for the stability of the Horn of Africa. A unified and inclusive approach is essential to break the cycle of violence and lay the groundwork for a sustainable peace. Achieving this vision will require innovative diplomacy, sustained engagement, and an unwavering commitment to the principles of human rights and democratic governance. Only through such concerted efforts can Sudan’s potential for stability and prosperity be realized.

References:

- Kidane Kiros, The ongoing war in Sudan and its implication for the security and stability of the Horn of Africa and beyond, Policy Brief (PB – 52/24), PCNS.

- Cameron Hudson, Looking Ahead after a Year of Conflict in Sudan, Commentary Published on April 12, 2024, CSIS.

- International Organization for Migration (IOM), Oct 29, 2024. DTM Sudan Mobility Update (10). IOM, Sudan.

RELATED CONTENT

  • May 4, 2021
    The Sahelian states of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso continue to face unprecedented violence arising from multidimensional conflicts. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2019), “the Sahel has experienced the most rapid increase in activity by militant groups of any region in Africa in recent years. Violent events involving extremist groups in the region have doubled every year since 2015”. In addition to the presence of multiple violent extremist organizations (VEO ...
  • Authors
    Sabine Cessou
    January 4, 2021
    Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso… L’insécurité fait tache d’huile au Sahel, menaçant de s’étendre aux pays du Golfe de Guinée. Le terrorisme a entraîné la formation de milices d’auto-défense communautaires, et ainsi créé des « friches » sécuritaires dans tout le Sahel, du Bassin du lac Tchad à la région du Liptako-Gourma. Les budgets consacrés à la défense augmentent, contrairement à ceux qui soutiennent le capital humain, santé et éducation. Dans un contexte de croissance démographique so ...
  • December 16, 2020
    President Trump may not enact his threatened US drawdown of troops from the Sahel, but President Biden will still face pressure to end America’s “forever wars” and reduce the number of American lives and treasure lost to fighting terrorism in Africa. If the United States pulls back from...
  • August 18, 2020
    Fragile, poor, and conflict-affected Sahelian countries of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso were expected to witness catastrophic health and security situations following the emergence of COVID-19. However, the number of cases and deaths remained relatively low in all three countries compared to other parts of the world. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) attempted to exploit the pandemic in their narratives, while continuing to conduct attacks in the region. Violence and attacks b ...
  • Authors
    June 15, 2020
    La Covid-19, menace conjoncturelle en dépit des impacts néfastes attendus, ne doit pas nous détourner complètement de menaces en phase de devenir structurelles et menacer toute une région dans son existence. Le terrorisme au Sahel et dans la région du Lac Tchad s’est avéré résilient face aux efforts jusqu’à présent déployés. Non seulement il n’a pas été vaincu au Sahel mais il avance vers son objectif final : atteindre l’Atlantique à travers les pays côtiers de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. ...
  • Authors
    December 7, 2019
    La présence de la France au Sahel n’est pas un sujet facile à discuter, à commenter ou à traiter. D’une part, l’intervention française, en 2013, (Opération Serval), avait permis de prolonger l’existence de l’Etat malien qui, sans l’opération française, n’aurait pas pu résister aux menées terroristes qui visaient Bamako. D’autre part, la présence française semble ne rien pouvoir changer à l’avancée du terrorisme dans la région, le phénomène semble même gagner du terrain devant l’imp ...
  • Authors
    Sabine Cessou
    June 19, 2018
    The second edition of the African Peace and Security Annual Conference (APSACO), organized in Rabat by OCP Policy Center, has started on June 18th with a broad debate on the political and strategic aspects of peacekeeping operations in Africa. Their financial cost was discussed right from the start of the Conference, as well as the ongoing reform processes engaged by the United Nations in addition to the African Union. “This cost is somewhat exaggerated,” said Rachid El Houdaigui, ...
  • Authors
    الأمين ولد سالم
    June 13, 2018
    خلال القمة التي عقدها الرئيس الفرنسي إيمانويل ماكرون في قصر الإليزيه بباريس في 29 مايو 2018، صادق الفاعلون الرئيسيون الأربعة في الأزمة الليبية على "الإعلان السياسي بشأن ليبيا" الذي ينص على إجراء انتخابات برلمانية ورئاسية في 10 ديسمبر القادم. هذه الوثيقة "التاريخية"، كما جاء على لسان الرئيس الفرنسي، تظل مهددة بالتعقيدات التي تطبع الأوضاع على أرض الواقع في ليبيا. كثيرة هي المبادرات التي هدفت إلى إخراج ليبيا من الفوضى التي تتخبط فيها منذ انهيار نظام العقيد معمر القذافي في 2011. لكن حت ...
  • Authors
    October 6, 2017
    Le message essentiel de ce Policy Brief porte sur les profondeurs dans la crise du Sahel. Certains aspects de la crise tels que la violence extrémiste, les migrations, le crime transnational ou encore la précarité ne sont que les symptômes d’une maladie qui ne fera qu’empirer si les causes réelles et profondes ne sont pas traitées. En prenant le cas du G5 Sahel, comme cadre pour des commodités de l’étude et de l’analyse, nous n’insinuons en aucun cas que la crise est limitée aux cin ...
  • From

    16
    5:30 pm February 2022
    Rida Lyammouri, Senior Fellow at Policy Center for the New South, will be speaking at the webinar “security and governence in africa: sahel and libya” organized by frica Study Group in partnership with The Middle East Institute. The security dynamics of the Maghreb and the Sahel are intertwined and the consequences of the Libyan conflict on the Sahel have been serious. Since its beginning in 2011, this conflict has triggered global concern about the economic, security, and geostrategic impacts on the Sahel. Current threats are posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation, and misuse of arms, as well as the flow of armed groups and mercenaries. Despite considerable international efforts, especially by African countries, the Sahel is still experiencing one of the ...