Publications /
Opinion

Back
Control of the Nile
August 24, 2021

The Nile is a monster, at 6,650 kilometers the longest river on the planet. Control of its waters has kept rulers in power for thousands of years. The Blue and White Niles merge in Khartoum then flow northwards, travelling through Sudan to Egypt, the glorious land of Pharaohs.

Conflict or cooperation

The Blue Nile nations, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, are facing the question of conflict or cooperation, as Sara Hasnaa Mokkadem wrote in her study for the Annual Report on Africa’s Geopolitics 2020 for the Policy Center for the New South. In April 2011, the Ethiopian government started the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), also known as the Millennium Dam, on the Blue Nile near the border with Sudan. Mokkadem noted: “Since the laying of the first stone, the GERD has been source of tension between the three countries.” War was considered possible, a seemingly incredible conflict possibly unavoidable. She added: “All three countries are clear about the economic cost of a potential conflict. A direct confrontation would be devastating for the region and would have far reaching consequences”. Egypt and Sudan fear that the dam will slow or, eventually, stop their water supplies, dramatically damaging agriculture and industry, adding to the water shortages felt already in larger Egyptian towns. In other words: the water is a national security issue, and military action is possible.

Over nearly a decade, numerous meetings and negotiations to ease tensions have failed to secure agreement. Although the downstream countries (Egypt and Sudan) remain extremely concerned about the consequences for their water security, work seems to progress on the dam, which is now 80% complete. “With its reservoir of 74 billion cubic meters of water—equivalent to Egypt’s annual water needs—16 turbines, and its expected production capacity of 6448 megawatts of electricity, it will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa. The planned energy production, equivalent to six nuclear power plants, could make Ethiopia the continent’s largest electricity producer and a net energy exporter,” Mokaddem wrote. Construction of the GERD has raised fears that the flow of the Nile will drop, undermining its value as a vital resource, particularly for Egypt. With 95% of its population concentrated on the banks of the river, Egypt already faces “an alarming situation. In proportion to the increase in its population, and to the decrease in its agricultural land, Egypt’s water needs are continually increasing. Since Ethiopia began construction in 2011, Egypt and Sudan have pushed for a tripartite agreement on how to operate the dam before filling”.

For example, as Hasnaa Mokkadem stated in her paper, the opponents of the project, mainly Sudan and Egypt, want “negotiated rules on filling the dam during drought years, and want the slowest possible filling time, 12 to 21 years, to minimize the effects of the filling on the flow of the Nile. However, Ethiopia wants to fill the reservoirs much faster, between five and seven years. Another sticking point is how the dam will be managed during periods of drought and how much water Ethiopia is willing to release in order to safeguard the downstream countries’ interests”. Mistrust and tension remain high. Ethiopia is not willing to accept international arbitration, as suggested by Cairo and Khartoum, but insists, wrote Mokaddem, that the GERD issue is an African matter, and negotiations should be part of an African Union-led process. “The exchange between the Blue Nile countries became more heated when in July 2020 satellite images revealed that water was being stored in the GERD reservoir, notwithstanding the two other countries’ objections, which has been shared with the United Nations Secretary General. In fact, in May and June 2021, the Egyptian and the Sudanese Foreign Ministers wrote to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) stressing the need to finalize an agreement on the Ethiopian dam and urging the international community to pressure Addis Ababa so it does not take any unilateral regarding the filling of the reservoir.” Obviously without success—on July 15, 2020, Ethiopia’s water minister announced that the filling of a reservoir behind the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has started. It is still unknown, where the source of this water flow is hiding. In the end it does not really matter as long nature is delivering rain and floods to feed the Nile, forever a mythical monster.

 

The opinions expressed in this article belong to the author.

RELATED CONTENT

  • Authors
    Eugène Berg
    Pascal Chaigneau
    Jérémy Ghez
    May 3, 2021
    Les Dialogues Stratégiques, une collaboration entre HEC Center for Geopolitcs et Policy Center for the New South, représentent une plateforme d’analyse et d’échange biannuelle réunissant des experts, des praticiens, des décideurs politiques, ainsi que le monde universitaire et les médias au service d’une réflexion critique et approfondie sur les tendances politiques mondiales et les grandes questions d’importance commune pour l’Europe et l’Afrique. Cette publication est issue de la ...
  • April 30, 2021
    La Méditerranée orientale a figuré en bonne place de l’actualité de ces derniers mois. Vieil espace de civilisation, objet de disputes et d’ambitions contradictoires entre puissances régi ...
  • April 29, 2021
    Le Général Azem Bermandoa, porte-parole de l’armée tchadienne, a annoncé, le 20 avril 2021, à 11h00, sur les ondes de la télévision, le décès du président Idriss Déby. Le défunt, touché lors de combats dans le nord du pays, entre l’armée tchadienne et la rébellion du Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT), est décédé des suites de ses blessures. Selon certains observateurs, une réunion de négociations avec des membres du FACT se serait terminée par une fusillade qui ...
  • Authors
    April 20, 2021
    The briefing document by Ambassador Dr. Len Ishmael created in collaboration with MDPD KAS reviews the process of the EU-OACPS negotiations, reviews the process of the EU-OACPS negotiations, with a view to providing insights on the following issues: - The challenges and bottlenecks in the process and those issues that have created tension. - The future roles of the African Union (AU) and #OACPS Secretariats in the EU-OACPS relationship, and in Africa’s relationship with the #EU. ...
  • April 09, 2021
    C’est dans un contexte marqué à la fois par la crise sanitaire liée à la pandémie de COVID-19 et par l’émergence de nouvelles menaces à la paix et à la sécurité du continent africain que ...
  • Authors
    March 24, 2021
    Tillabéri region of Niger is witnessing unprecedented level of ethnic-based violence. The January 2 massacre caught the national and international actors’ attention, however; the event was preventable. Accessing communities through ethnically charged and other exploitative language has proved to be a game changer for the expansion of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) expansion since 2012. The failure of national and international actors to recognize the seriousness of the situa ...
  • March 17, 2021
    Cette étude concerne la Communauté économique des Etats d'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), rappelant, tout d'abord, leur diversité géographique, démographique et économique. Montrant ce que ces Etats ont en commun mais, aussi, ce qui les différencie. La CEDEAO, qui réunit quinze pays parmi les plus pauvres de la planète, si on se réfère à leur PIB par habitant, en dollar courant ou en parité de pouvoir d'achat/PPA/. Ce qui explique une démographie explosive, sans que l'on puisse dire si ...
  • March 8, 2021
    Cet article sera publié dans le numéro 173 de la Revue Commentaire. Le président chinois Xi-Jin-Ping et les plus hauts responsables européens se sont accordés fin décembre sur les termes d’un Accord global sur l’investissement (Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, CAI). Le texte reste à formaliser, mais les dirigeants se sont engagés. Pour situer sa portée, rappelons que l’investissement est une compétence récente de l’Union européenne (2008). Concrètement, l’Union n’entend plus ...
  • Authors
    Christophe Bertossi
    Matthieu Tardis
    February 26, 2021
    Si les migrations en provenance d’Afrique constituent la priorité des politiques européennes de contrôle des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne (UE), les dynamiques migratoires africaines sont pourtant avant tout régionales. Les migrations subsahariennes sont très peu connectées aux flux transcontinentaux : plus de 70 % restent en Afrique. Si l’on observe le continent dans son ensemble, en y ajoutant les pays du Maghreb et l’Afrique du Sud (deux régions mieux connectées a ...